Deal Types · 10 min read · Updated November 2026
Corporate Carve-Outs in Private Equity: Standalone Costs, TSAs and What Buyers Change
How private equity carve-outs work: standalone costs, transition services agreements, separation costs and financing, with a worked carve-out LBO.
A carve-out is the purchase of a business unit that a larger company no longer considers core, which means the buyer has to separate it from its parent before it can run on its own. That separation is the deal: rebuilding the costs the parent used to cover, paying for transition services until the new company can replace them, and financing a business whose standalone financial statements may be incomplete, built on allocations or hard to reconstruct.
A carve-out can give a business an owner willing to fund projects the parent deferred. It can also leave the buyer paying for functions the parent supplied below cost. In the worked example, a $1.5 million annual standalone cost gap reduces value by $9 million at 6.0x. The separate $6 million of one-time separation spending also has to be funded.
What Is a Carve-Out?
A carve-out sale, one kind of divestiture, happens when a company sells a business unit or set of assets that no longer fits its strategy. It differs from a spin-off, in which the parent hands the unit’s shares to its own shareholders instead of selling it, and from an equity carve-out, a partial IPO of a subsidiary. In private equity, a carve-out almost always means the sale. Ted Seides describes carve-outs as among the most complex deals private equity firms complete, and also among the most attractive: a unit buried inside a large company may have lacked management attention, leaving its team, marketing and products underfunded (Private Equity Deals, 2024, ch. 12).
| Standalone buyout | Carve-out | |
|---|---|---|
| Financial history | Company-level statements, which may be audited or unaudited | Segment records or carve-out statements, potentially including allocated overhead |
| Day one | The company runs as before | The business depends on the seller for systems, services and data |
| Additional agreements | Deal-specific supply, property or other arrangements | Often a transition services agreement plus supply, license or other shared-service arrangements |
| Costs to price | The existing cost base | Standalone costs plus one-time separation costs |
| Financing | Lenders size on the company’s history | Lenders may hold back until the standalone numbers are tested |
| Seller’s objective | Depends on the owners and process | Can include proceeds, business continuity and a clean release from retained obligations |
Standalone EBITDA: The Number That Sets the Price
First reconcile the division’s reported results to the parent’s records. Some functions may be charged as allocations, while others sit centrally and never hit segment EBITDA. Add back only costs already charged that will fall away, and include the replacement cost of every function the business needs. For a US registrant, SEC staff guidance separately addresses reflecting all historical costs and disclosing materially different standalone estimates. SEC Financial Reporting Manual, section 7210
The allocation can be wrong in either direction. In KKR and Silver Lake’s 2005 purchase of Agilent’s semiconductor group, the deal team expected a standalone business to run on substantially lower SG&A than Agilent allocated, but still had to piece together the new company’s cost structure bottom up to prove it, inside a two-week confirmatory diligence window. The case notes the problem common to carve-outs: many connections between the unit being sold and the parent, and no fully allocated standalone costs (Private Equity in Action, 2017, Case 11).
Bridge from $25.0 million of reported segment EBITDA: add back $3.0 million of corporate costs allocated by the parent, less $4.5 million of standalone costs built bottom up, to $23.5 million of standalone EBITDA (highlighted).
- Reported segment EBITDA$25.0M
- Add back the parent's allocated corporate costs+$3.0M
- Less standalone costs, built bottom up−$4.5M
- Standalone EBITDA$23.5M
Bars start at $15.0M so the smaller items stay visible.
Illustration: the published house case is a standalone company, not a carve-out.
| What the bridge does to the price | Amount |
|---|---|
| Price at 6.0x reported EBITDA ($25.0M) | $150.0M |
| Price at 6.0x standalone EBITDA ($23.5M) | $141.0M |
| One-time separation costs (IT, rebranding, hiring), outside EBITDA | $6.0M |
The $1.5 million gap between allocation and standalone cost is worth $9 million of price at six times EBITDA. The separation costs are a use of cash at or soon after closing, funded like fees.
Imagine you have just been handed the confidential information memorandum on a company that has come to us as a possible acquisition.
No more than two pages, in Word or PowerPoint, on (i) the main investment opportunities and risks, (ii) the questions and areas you would follow up in due diligence, and (iii) your recommendation and your valuation.
The company in the memorandum makes steering gears for heavy trucks, and its parent is selling it.
Transition Services Agreements
A transition services agreement (TSA) buys time for specified functions. Walk one order from sale to cash and one payroll from timecard to bank transfer. Identify the systems, permissions, licenses and people the seller controls, then test which services must continue after closing.
- OwnershipBrands, patents and other intellectual property; which entity owns what at closing.
- ContractsSupplier and customer contracts, many shared with the parent and split or reassigned one by one.
- OperationsManufacturing processes, supply chain and the products still in the R&D pipeline.
- Systems and dataERP, finance, payroll, websites and the data held in the parent's systems. Usually the longest TSA.
- PeopleA management team, a finance function and the staff who move with the business.
- Exit the TSAReplace each service, then stop paying the parent for it. The plan needs dates and owners.
The timelines run long. In KPS Capital Partners’ 2017 carve-out of TaylorMade from Adidas, the deal involved close to 500 contracts, the athlete contracts were shared and had to be split, and transition services ran for 18 months after closing (Seides, ch. 15). In an earlier Advent carve-out of Walmart’s Brazilian business, the IT transition was the hardest piece because the data sat in Bentonville (ch. 12). Separation work fills a carve-out’s first 100 days before most other initiatives can start.
Financing a Carve-Out
Shiseido’s sale to Advent shows why the face amount and closing cash belong on separate lines. Of the $700 million purchase price, $350 million was cash and $350 million was a seven-year seller note. In its FY2024 results Shiseido recorded a ¥12.8 billion provision related to the note. The note was part of the consideration and carried collection risk. Shiseido transaction notice and FY2024 supplemental data, seller note.
Adidas also deferred part of the TaylorMade consideration. It announced a US$425 million sale, about half in cash, with the remainder split between a secured note and contingent consideration. A lender sizing debt should model the terms of each claim, its payment dates and any subordination. Adidas transaction announcement
The same caution shows up in larger deals. The Agilent semiconductor team wrote that its record purchase price required a substantial debt package, while the operational risk of the separation pushed it toward a conservative debt structure (Private Equity in Action, Case 11). In a model, that means three things: size debt on standalone EBITDA, leave room for separation costs and TSA fees in the early years, and consider seller financing to bridge the gap.
A carve-out version of the house case
Suppose Industrial Inc. were a division of a larger industrial group rather than a standalone company. This is an illustration; the published case is not a carve-out. Reported EBITDA is $25.0 million, including $3.0 million of corporate costs allocated by the parent. A bottom-up build puts standalone costs at $4.5 million a year, so standalone EBITDA is $23.5 million, and $1.5 million lower in every projected year. Separation costs total $6.0 million.
| Approach | Price | Debt | Sponsor equity | MOIC and IRR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform only (teaching schedule) | $150.0M | $80.0M | $80.0M | 3.06x, 25.1% |
| Carve-out priced on reported EBITDA | $150.0M | $75.0M | $91.0M | 2.61x, 21.1% |
| Carve-out priced on standalone EBITDA | $141.0M | $75.0M | $82.0M | 2.89x, 23.7% |
- Debt is sized on standalone EBITDA: 3.2x $23.5 million is about $75 million.
- Paying on reported EBITDA costs four points of IRR: the standalone costs reduce every year’s EBITDA and the exit value, while the separation costs and a smaller loan add $11 million to the equity check.
- Pricing on standalone EBITDA reduces the equity check from $91 million to $82 million, taking the modeled IRR from 21.1% to 23.7%. Keeping the same exit proceeds but removing $6 million of day-one separation spending would reduce that $82 million check to $76 million. That isolates the cost of separation from the earnings adjustment.
Horizontal bars of sponsor IRR: 25.1% for the house case, 21.1% for a carve-out priced on reported EBITDA, and 23.7% for a carve-out priced on standalone EBITDA (highlighted).
What New Owners Change After a Carve-Out
The argument for carve-outs is that the parent was the wrong owner. Named cases show what changes once a unit gets its own management and capital:
| Business | Former parent | What the new owner changed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Orangina (2006) | Cadbury Schweppes | Lion Capital and Blackstone bought the European Beverages division, including several brands. Lion and Blackstone became equal owners of the beverage business. | Buyers’ closing announcement |
| TaylorMade (2017) | Adidas | Pricing had stagnated for years below thresholds such as $399 for a driver; under KPS the top driver went from under $500 to over $600. Athlete spending moved from about 400 contracted players to those with the biggest audiences | Seides, ch. 15 |
| BlueTriton (2021) | Nestlé | Spring water brands sold at a discount of up to 70 cents a gallon to filtered municipal water from rival brands, a pricing gap the buyer set out to close | Seides, ch. 14 |
| Orveon (2021) | Shiseido | Three brands with ¥44.8 billion of 2020 sales, 4.9% of Shiseido’s total, got a new CEO, a chief transformation officer and an entirely new management team within eight months, each with personal money invested | Seides, ch. 12; sales from Shiseido |
One reason to diligence the investment backlog is that valuable R&D can be easy to cut and hard to rebuild. In a study of 495 PE transactions, Lerner, Sørensen and Strömberg found that patents granted after these deals received more citations. The sample covered PE transactions broadly. It does not establish a return premium for carve-outs. Authors’ research paper
How to Handle a Carve-Out in a Case Study
When the memorandum describes a parent selling a division, reviewers look for four things. Most of them are quality of earnings questions in a different setting, and our due diligence guide covers how to rank them:
- A standalone EBITDA bridge from the reported number, with the parent’s allocations and your standalone cost estimate shown separately.
- Separation costs in sources and uses, or in the first years’ cash flow, with a line for TSA fees.
- Debt sized on standalone EBITDA, with a note on whether lenders will accept the carve-out’s numbers or need a seller note.
- Diligence questions about the separation: which contracts are shared, which systems the business depends on, which people move and what the TSA costs and covers.
Then the price: say what the business is worth on standalone numbers, not what the parent’s segment report implies.
Carve-out traps
| Trap | What goes wrong | How to catch it | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pricing on reported segment EBITDA | The multiple is applied to EBITDA that still carries the parent's allocations. | Ask what the business will spend on finance, IT, HR and insurance on its own. | Build standalone costs bottom up and price on standalone EBITDA. |
| Leaving out separation costs | Sources and uses show fees but no money for systems, rebranding or hiring. | Look for a separation budget with dates. | Add one-time separation costs to uses or to early-year cash flow. |
| Treating the TSA as free | No TSA fees in the projections and no date for exiting each service. | Read the TSA's scope, price and term. | Model TSA fees during the transition and the standalone cost after it. |
| Debt sized as if the business had a history | Leverage matches a standalone buyout of the same size. | Ask what lenders will lend without audited standalone statements. | Size on standalone EBITDA, leave a cushion and consider a seller note. |
| Assuming shared contracts transfer | Key customer or supplier terms are carried over without review. | List the contracts that are shared with the parent or need consent. | Diligence each one; price the risk of losing or repricing it. |
Carve-out model checklist
- Reported to standalone EBITDA bridge, with allocations and standalone costs on separate lines.
- Standalone cost estimate built bottom up, by function.
- One-time separation costs with timing, funded in sources and uses or early cash flow.
- TSA fees by service, with an exit date for each.
- Debt sized on standalone EBITDA; seller note or earn-out if lenders hold back.
- Diligence list for shared contracts, systems, data and people.
- Price stated on standalone numbers, with the separation risk named.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a carve-out in private equity? A carve-out is the purchase of a business unit or group of assets from a larger company that no longer sees it as core. The unit has been run inside the parent, sharing its systems, contracts, people and data, so the deal includes separating it, usually with a transition services agreement while the new company builds its own.
What is a transition services agreement? A transition services agreement (TSA) is a contract under which the seller keeps providing services such as IT, accounting, payroll, supply chain or data hosting to the carved-out business for a fee, for a set period, until the new owner can run them itself. In KPS Capital Partners’ carve-out of TaylorMade from Adidas, transition services ran for 18 months after closing.
What are standalone costs in a carve-out? Standalone costs are what the business will spend to run the functions the parent used to provide, such as finance, IT, HR, legal, insurance and treasury. They replace the parent’s allocated overhead in the division’s reported numbers, and they can be higher or lower than the allocation, so buyers rebuild them from the bottom up.
Why do private equity firms like carve-outs? A division buried in a large company may have been underinvested in its team, marketing and products, and a parent that has decided to sell may care more about moving on than about the last dollar of price. Both create room for a buyer that can manage the separation.
How do you model a carve-out LBO? Start from the division’s reported EBITDA, reverse the parent charges that will cease, include any missing shared functions, subtract the replacement cost, and price the deal on that standalone EBITDA. Add one-time separation costs to uses, model TSA fees during the transition, and size debt conservatively, because the standalone history lenders see is allocated or reconstructed.
How long do carve-outs take to separate? The timetable varies by service. In David Shapiro’s account, TaylorMade used transition services for 18 months and had close to 500 contracts to address. For a new deal, schedule each migration, its acceptance test, extension price and fallback.
Sources
Transactions (company announcements):
- Shiseido, announcement of the sale of its bareMinerals, BUXOM and Laura Mercier brands to an Advent International affiliate (August 2021): the businesses’ FY2020 sales of ¥44.8 billion, 4.9% of consolidated net sales, and the price and its cash portion.
- adidas, sale of TaylorMade, Adams Golf and Ashworth to KPS Capital Partners (May 2017).
Practitioner accounts and case studies:
- Ted Seides, Private Equity Deals (2024): ch. 12, Orveon by Advent International (interview with Tricia Glynn, November 21, 2022); ch. 14, BlueTriton by One Rock Capital; ch. 15, TaylorMade by KPS Capital Partners (interview with David Shapiro, February 9, 2023).
- Claudia Zeisberger, Michael Prahl and Bowen White, Private Equity in Action (Wiley, 2017), Case 11, “Chips on the Side (A): The Buyout of Avago Technologies”: standalone costs and the conservative debt structure.
Research summaries:
- Josh Lerner and Ann Leamon, Venture Capital, Private Equity, and the Financing of Entrepreneurship, 2nd ed. (Wiley, 2023), p. 351: Orangina and the studies of innovation after buyouts.
Our calculations:
- The house case: PE Case Study: $150M Distribution LBO. The carve-out version and its figures are our own illustration on the teaching schedule described above; the published case is not a carve-out.
Revision History
- : Traced the seller note and its collection risk to Shiseido's financial reporting.
- : First published, with a standalone EBITDA bridge and an illustrative carve-out of the house case.